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THE SIXTH ANNUAL GROTIUS LECTURE:*
WORLD ON FIRE
AMY CHUA**
Many thanks to all of you for coming this evening. It's a great
pleasure and honor for me to be giving the Grotius Lecture this year.
I'm very grateful to Hannah Buxbaum, Charlotte Ku, and Anne-
Marie Slaughter for inviting me. Many thanks also to Danny Brad-
low and to the American University, Washington College of Law for
co-sponsoring this event and to Upendra Baxi for commenting. My
plan is to speak for about thirty minutes. I'll start by presenting the
main thesis of my book, World on Fire,1 and I'll try to illustrate that
thesis with examples from specific countries, from Indonesia to Bo-
livia to Russia to Sierra Leone. I'll then shift my focus to the United
States and how it fits into the picture. I'll conclude with some
* Editor's Note: the following is a revised version of the Grotius Lecture presented
at the American Society of International Law's ("ASIL") 98th Annual Meeting,
which was held March 31-April 3, 2004. The Grotius Lecture Series is co-
sponsored by the American University Washington College of Law, ASIL, and the
International Legal Studies Program. The purpose of the Grotius Lecture Series is
to open the ASIL forum to distinguished scholars for the purpose of discussing
new and important topics in international law that might not otherwise be heard. It
also provides a forum for participants to create an expanded space, giving them
opportunities to explore the intellectual underpinnings of timely issues of interna-
tional law.
** Amy Chua is currently a Professor of Law at Yale University. She lectures fre-
quently on the effects of globalization to government, academic, business, and
NGO groups. She has also lectured widely outside the United States, including in
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, China, Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey, South Africa, and the
UK. Her areas of teaching include contracts, law and development, international
business transactions, and law and globalization. She holds both an A.B. and a J.D.
from Harvard University.
1. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET
DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003) [hereinaf-
ter WORLD ON FIRE].
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thoughts about policy implications for international institutions and
international lawyers.
Let me begin, then, by taking you back to 1989-the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the death of communism. As I'm sure many of you re-
member, a kind of consensus-a triumphal consensus--emerged at
that time, not only in the United States, but to a considerable extent
around the world. And that consensus was that markets and democ-
racy, working hand-in-hand, would transform the world into a com-
munity of modernized, productive, peace-loving nations.2 In the
process, ethnic hatred, religious zealotry, and other "backward" as-
pects of underdevelopment would be swept away.3
Unfortunately, if you look at the last fifteen years, something very
different has happened. Since 1989, we have seen the proliferation of
ethnic conflict, intensifying nationalism, fundamentalism, anti-
Americanism, confiscations, expulsions, calls for re-nationalization,
and two genocides of a magnitude unprecedented since the Nazi
Holocaust. Why? What happened?
Part of the answer lies in the relationship-and, increasingly, the
explosive collision-among the three most powerful forces operating
in the world today: markets, democracy, and ethnic hatred.4
The central thesis of my book is that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, markets and democracy-at least in the form in which
they're currently being promoted-may not be mutually-reinforcing
in the developing world. On the contrary, in many non-Western
countries, markets and democracy may be on a collision course.
And the reason for this has to do with a phenomenon that is perva-
sive outside the West, yet almost never acknowledged, indeed often
viewed as taboo. This is the phenomenon of what I call market-
2. See id. at 20 (explaining the development of global organizations like the
International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development for the purpose of "modernizing" and privatizing developing coun-
tries).
3. But see id. at 21 (stating that global markets have generally accentuated the
dominance of "outsider" minorities, and have fueled ethnic envy and hatred within
impoverished majorities).
4. See id. at 16 (noting that the sobering lesson of globalization is that the




dominant minorities ("MDMs"): ethnic minorities who, along with
foreign investors, can be expected under market conditions to eco-
nomically dominate the "indigenous" majorities around them, at least
in the near to midterm future.5
Examples of MDMs include the Chinese throughout Southeast
Asia6 (most recently, unknown to most Americans, ethnic Chinese
have literally taken over the economies of Rangoon and Mandalay in
Burma); Indians throughout East Africa and parts of the Caribbean;
the Lebanese in West Africa and parts of the Caribbean; the Ibo in
Nigeria; the Bamileke in Cameroon; Tutsi in Rwanda; Kikuyu in
Kenya; whites in South Africa; whites in Zimbabwe; Croatians in the
former Yugoslavia; Jews in post-Communist Russia; Tamils in Sri
Lanka; and Bengalis in Assam-the list goes on, quite strikingly, as I
try to document in my book. Before I go on, let me flag something
that I hope is obvious to all of you from this list: groups can be mar-
ket-dominant for very different reasons, ranging from "entrepreneu-
rialism" and social networks to a history of apartheid or colonial op-
pression. For example, if, as with whites in South Africa, a small
minority uses force to relegate the majority to inferior education and
inhumane conditions for over a century-that minority is likely to be
a MDM.7 And this has nothing necessarily to do with "culture."
On the other hand, to be clear, by market dominance, I'm not just
talking about vague ethnic stereotypes, but rather about starkly-
disproportionate control of major sectors of the economy. So, in the
Philippines, where my own family is from, the Chinese make up only
one percent of the population, but control as much as sixty percent of
the private economy, including all the major airlines and virtually all
the major banks and businesses.8 Similarly, whites in South Africa
currently make up roughly fourteen percent of the population, but
5. See id. at 6 (labeling market-dominant minorities "the Achilles' heel of free
market democracy").
6. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 23-34 (documenting how, unknown
to most Americans, ethnic Chinese have taken over the economies of Rangoon and
Mandalay in Burma).
7. See id. at 97-100 (contrasting the disproportionate amount of wealth con-
trolled by South African whites, which is attributable to the "head start" given by
the whites' forbearers, who destroyed blacks' human capital).
8. See id. at 36-37 (describing the obvious presence of the Chinese in the Phil-
ippine economy, such as in the Chinese-controlled Manila Stock Exchange).
2004] 1241
AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.
still own more than eighty-five percent of the arable land and, at least
until very recently, owned all of South Africa's largest conglomer-
ates.9 Less well-known, but very typical of many Latin American
countries, in Guatemala, a tiny minority of light-skinned elites con-
trol almost all of the nation's wealth, while the Mayan Indians,
nearly seventy percent of the population, live in abject and often illit-
erate poverty.10
Similarly, I recently spent some time in Bolivia. At one point, I
was having dinner with a wealthy businessman who was actually the
brother of the president of the country at the time. He said to me (and
I quote): "[t]his is a country where three percent of us run every-
thing-politics, culture, the economy-and sixty-five percent of the
population have no future."" That was just a few years ago, and I'll
say more in a second about what has happened in Bolivia since. But
it's very striking, although a majority or near-majority of the popula-
tion in Bolivia are Amerindian (principally Aymara and Quechua In-
dians), that the president was white, spent much of his life in Con-
necticut, was educated at the University of Chicago, and speaks
Spanish with an English accent!
The phenomenon of MDMs has a number of sobering implications
for international policy and international lawyers. Most crucially, in
developing countries with a MDM, markets and democracy will tend
to favor not only just different people, or differing classes, but differ-
ent ethnic groups. Markets magnify the often astounding wealth of
the market-dominant minority while democracy increases the politi-
cal power of the impoverished indigenous majority. In such circum-
stances, where the rich aren't just rich, but also belong to a resented
"outsider" ethnic group, the pursuit of free market democracy often
9. See Amy L. Chua, "Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New
Paradigm for Law and Development," 108 YALE L. J. 1, 65 (1998) (noting that
whites in South Africa are likely to sustain their market dominance under free
market conditions in the near to midterm future).
10. See Michael Holley, "Recognizing the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to
Their Traditional Lands: A Case-study of an Internally-displaced Community in
Guatemala," 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 119, 128-29 (1997) (summarizing the pov-
erty faced by the Mayans in Guatemala, and noting that an elite comprising two
percent of the population controls seventy-two percent of all tillable lands).
11. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 76 (quoting a Bolivian tycoon's pre-
dictions for his country).
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becomes an engine of catastrophic ethnonationalism,12 pitting a poor
"indigenous" majority, easily manipulated and aroused by opportun-
istic vote-seeking politicians, against wealthy outsiders, including
both foreign investors and these "foreigners within."
Let me illustrate with Indonesia. Free market policies in the 19 80s
and 1990s led to a situation in which the country's tiny three percent
ethnic Chinese minority controlled an astounding seventy percent of
the private economy, 3 understandably creating tremendous hostility
and envy among the indigenous majority. 4 The introduction of de-
mocracy in 1998-hailed with euphoria in the United States-
unfortunately produced a violent backlash against both the Chinese
and markets. Five thousand shops and homes of ethnic Chinese were
burned and looted, 2,000 people died, and 150 ethnic Chinese
women were gang-raped. 5 Free and fair elections in the midst of all
this naturally gave rise to ethnic scapegoating by demagogic politi-
cians, along with calls for confiscation of Chinese assets and the es-
tablishment of a "People's Economy" that would finally return Indo-
nesia's wealth to the pribumi majority, the country's "true owners. "16
Because of the violence and calls for confiscation, many Sino-
Indonesians (including most of wealthiest) left the country, along
with massive amounts of Chinese-controlled capital, estimated at $40
to $100 billion, plunging Indonesia into an economic crisis from
which it has still not recovered. 7
12. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4 (attributing the increase in ethnic
violence to globalization, at least in part).
13. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that all of Indonesia's bil-
lionaires are Chinese and that Sino-Indonesians own all of the major conglomer-
ates, with the exception of those owned by Suharto's family).
14. See id. at 136 (referring to Indonesia's wealthy Chinese minority as
"greedy Chinese locusts").
15. See Gregg Jones, Fear Overwhelming Indonesia's Chinese, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 4, 1998, at Al (quoting indigenous Indonesians who connect
the attacks on the Chinese to their link with Suharto, and threatening future pun-
ishment because the Chinese have "too many privileges").
16. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 136-37 (describing the "New Deal"
envisioned by Indonesian politicians, which included breaking up Chinese con-
glomerates and redistributing the pieces to the masses by way of indigenous coop-
eratives).
17. See Jones, supra note 15, at Al (addressing the hesitation of many Chinese
to return to Indonesia despite financial connections and longtime family ties to the
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What I argue in my book is that whenever free market democracy
is pursued in the presence of a MDM, the almost invariable result is
backlash. This backlash, moreover, typically takes one of three
highly-determinate, predictable forms. The first is a backlash against
markets, targeting the MDMs' wealth (for example, through confis-
cation or nationalization of their assets). The second is a backlash
against democracy by forces favorable to the MDM. The third and
most vicious form of backlash is majority-supported violence aimed
at killing off the MDM itself. These three kinds of backlashes have
been playing out all over the non-Western world. Let me give you
some examples.
The first kind of backlash I mentioned is an ethnically-targeted
anti-market backlash. Again, unknown to most Americans, the Indo-
nesian government is currently sitting on about $58 billion worth of
nationalized industrial assets, almost all formerly owned by Chinese
tycoons (Suharto's cronies).18 Many of these state takeovers may
have been justified initially, but the problem is that, for the last five
years, these assets, once highly-productive, 19 have just been stagnat-
ing, while unemployment and poverty in Indonesia deepen. But the
government has been afraid to re-privatize those assets, precisely be-
cause there is so much hostility among the indigenous majority
against Chinese or U.S. "vultures" swooping back in to control the
Indonesian economy.20 As a result, a frightening forty million Indo-
nesians are underemployed or unemployed-making Indonesia a
breeding ground for extremist, fundamentalist, and terrorist organiza-
tions.2'
country).
18. See George J. Aditjondro, Suharto & Sons (And Daughters, In-Laws &
Cronies), WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1998, at Cl (explaining that many of these Chi-
nese tycoons were considered Suharto's cronies and funneled money not just to
Indonesia, but also to the Suharto family).
19. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 137 (quoting one government official
who described the former Chinese companies, which range from automobile pro-
duction companies to cement companies, as "money making machines").
20. See id. at 138 (noting that the "vultures" include an ethnic Chinese sect
known as the Salim Group, which purportedly is attempting to take back its former
companies from Singapore).
21. See id. at 225 (comparing elements contributing to the violence and conflict




Indonesia is just one example of a much broader global pattern.
Robert Mugabe's recent confiscations in Zimbabwe are another ex-
ample of an ethnically-targeted anti-market backlash. With much of
Zimbabwe now starving, the international community continues to
call eloquently for "free and fair elections" and "rule of law. 22
Sadly, these "buzzwords" avoid the really hard problem: namely,
that Zimbabwe came to independence and democracy in the face of a
one percent former colonizer MDM that for generations controlled
seventy percent of the country's best land and virtually its entire ad-
vanced commercial sector.23 Mugabe's latest confiscations are not
just directed at whites, but also at black opponents of Mugabe; more-
over, the confiscations have proven so economically disastrous that
they may not be majority-supported at this point.24 But it is crucial to
remember that Robert Mugabe himself is a product of democracy.
He swept to power in the closely-monitored elections of 1980, prom-
ising to take back the "stolen land" from the whites.2 6 But in part be-
cause of pressure from foreign investors, including the International
Monetary Fund and the governments of the United States and the
United Kingdom, almost no significant land redistribution took place
between 1980 and 2000.27 Not surprisingly, every time elections
22. See Dumisani Muleya, AAGM: AU Steps Up Pressure on Zimbabwe.,
ZIMB. INDEP., July 7, 2004 (reporting on a speech by United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in which the Secretary-General calls on Mugabe and other Af-
rican leaders to stop resistance to democracy and embrace free and fair elections
and the rule of law), available at 2004 WL 70335762; see also WORLD ON FIRE,
supra note 1, at 11 (discussing the naivet6 of the calls by Western nations and hu-
man rights groups for democracy and "free and fair elections").
23. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 128 (labeling the state-sanctioned
violence against white landowners and their black farmhands in Zimbabwe as "an-
archy born of democracy" because it was, in fact, a democratic election that
brought Mugabe to power).
24. See id. at 129 (citing the Western media's conclusion that Mugabe would
have lost the 2002 election had the election been "free and fair," but recognizing
African governments' praise for the 2002 election, which was, in fact, no more ir-
regular than other elections in Africa that the West had deemed "free and fair").
25. See id. at II (recalling that Mugabe himself is a product of democracy).
26. See id. at 127 (describing Mugabe's rise to power as fueled by rhetoric such
as "[w]e cannot expect to buy back our land that was never bought from us," and
"[o]ur party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man-our real
enemy").
27. See id. at 130 (noting Zimbabwe's dilemma: that foreign investors and
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came around, Mugabe played the race card-as he did in anticipation
of the 2000 and 2002 elections.28
I would also say that the recent targeting of the three Jewish bil-
lionaires in Russia is another variation on the same phenomenon. In
the last few years, President Putin has attempted to arrest and confis-
cate the holdings of Boris Berezovsky, Vladmir Gusinsky, and most
recently, Mikhail Khodorkofsky. I do not believe that Putin himself
is motivated by anti-Semitism. But all three of the targeted "oli-
garchs" are well-known in Russia to be Jewish, and Putin's arrests
have been facilitated by pervasive anti-Semitic resentment among the
Russian majority.2 9 Perhaps more surprisingly, we're also seeing a
growing number of popular, ethnically-tinged, anti-market move-
ments in parts of Latin America. Latin America is a developing re-
gion that, at least for the last half century, has seen much less distinc-
tively ethnic (as opposed to class) strife, largely because of the
"mestization"3 ° of the region and the much more muted ethnic lines.
But this may be changing with globalization. Particularly in coun-
tries like Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, where indigenous American
Indians still represent an impoverished, long-oppressed majority or
near-majority of the population, we are seeing democracy now fuel-
ing ethnically-tinged, anti-market movements. The rhetoric from in-
digenous politicians in these countries sounds a lot like Robert Mug-
abe's in Zimbabwe: "Bolivia's land belongs to the Aymara and
global capital flee whenever the country attempts to upset property rights of white
land owners).
28. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 129 (explaining that Mugabe began
seizures of commercial farms owned by the "sons of Britain," causing the coun-
try's stock to fall, resulting in the loss of millions of dollars of export earnings, and
creating a situation in which half a million people starved).
29. See id. at 138-42 (asserting that the combined forces of "marketization and
democratization" have produced "galvanized anti-Semitism" in Russia). The de-
mocratic rights of free speech and freedom of association have given way to the
formation of eighty different Russian political parties, including three that incorpo-
rate neo-Nazi ideals. Id. In addition, Russian politicians and elected officials
openly espouse anti-Semitism. Id.
30. See id. at 57 (defining Latin American society as characterized by a social
spectrum, one end of which is occupied by the lighter-skinned, while the other end
is comprised of the darker, indigenous "masses"). The countries of Latin America
tend to be characterized by what sociologists have termed a "pigmentocracy." Id.
[19:12391246
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Quechua Indians and not the whites;"3 "[w]e indigenous peoples are
like foreigners in our own ancestral lands; 3 2 and "[t]he whites
should leave the country."33
As you may have read in the papers, Bolivia exploded last Fall-
sadly, along exactly the lines I predicted in my book. President
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, who as I mentioned is white and gener-
ally a pro-United States, pro-free trade, and pro-foreign investment
leader, ultimately fled for his life after weeks of apparently majority-
supported, Amerindian-led protests and escalating violence that left
over sixty people dead.
34
But there's a second kind of possible backlash. In the contest be-
tween an economically powerful ethnic minority and a numerically
powerful poor majority, the poor majority doesn't always win. Often,
the money wins. Instead of a backlash against the market, another
likely outcome is a backlash against democracy, favoring the MDM
at the expense of majority will. Examples of this are extremely
common. In fact, if each of you try to think of the world's most noto-
rious cases of crony capitalism, I think you will be struck to find that
they all involved a MDM. For example, take General Suharto in In-
donesia. Americans prefer to forget this, but Suharto was a U.S. dar-
ling for years because he pursued aggressive economic liberalization
and pro-foreign investment policies. To that end, Suharto had no
choice but to reach out to his country's entrepreneurial Chinese mi-
nority, who were the only ones with the business skills he needed.
Throughout his rule, Suharto not only protected the Chinese politi-
cally, but affirmatively directed lucrative business opportunities to a
select few of them.35 And the Chinese returned these favors both by
31. Id. at 50.
32. Id. at 162.
33. WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1.
34. See generally Jimmy Langman, A President Gets the Boot, NEWSWEEK
INT'L, Oct. 27, 2003, at 37 (attributing the fatalities to the government's inappro-
priate response to anti-pipeline protests by Bolivians who viewed the president's
actions as putting foreign investors' interests before Bolivians').
35. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 152 (describing Suharto's relation-
ship with two powerful Chinese Indonesians and the joint ventures into which they
entered).
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generating enormous economic growth for the country, and by add-
ing enormously to the personal wealth of the Suharto family.
3 6
Other examples of egregious crony capitalism: Marcos' Chinese-
friendly dictatorship in the Philippines;37 President Daniel arap Moi's
corrupt regime in Kenya,3" which was closely bound up with a hand-
ful of South Asian tycoons; and Sierra Leone. 39 As to the latter, what
did Sierra Leone look like before the limb-chopping rebels took
over? The answer reflects a pattern typical of the West African re-
gion: President Siaka Stevens, an indigenous African president, acted
in symbiotic corrupt alliance with a tiny cohort of enormously rich
Lebanese businessmen who controlled the diamond industry.
40
Finally, I argue that both the Rwandan and Yugoslavian genocides
are in part manifestations of the third kind of backlash-i.e. ethnic
cleansing targeting a starkly-disproportionately wealthy MDM (here,
I really want to stress the words "in part" because there were so
many complex dynamics in both those cases, and I am only offering
a small piece of the picture; and I'm certainly not suggesting that
those genocides were principally economically-driven, which would
be absurd).
Now, what does all this have to do with the United States? How do
we fit into this picture? I have two answers, both sobering. First, we
are-and have been-the principal exporter of markets and democ-
racy, sometimes with the best of intentions. I'll have more to say
36. See id. (estimating Suharto's wealth at $16 billion, but noting that Central
Intelligence Agency information indicates that it is closer to $32 billion).
37. See id. at 153-57 (discussing how President Marcos courted the Filipino
Chinese and even offered them Philippine citizenship in exchange for large and
consistent payments).
38. See id. at 157 (explaining that President Moi, in need of capital, aligned
with Indian businessmen who offered him financial compensation in exchange for
political protection). President Moi's regime was closely-tied to a handful of South
Asian tycoons. Id.
39. See id. at 148 (recounting how President Stevens declared a state of emer-
gency in Sierra Leone in order to form a shadow alliance with five powerful Leba-
nese diamond dealers and cash in on the country's diamond resources).
40. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 148 (detailing the arrangement be-
tween the Lebanese and Siaka, which included Siaka giving the most lucrative




about this-and what we should do going forward-in a moment.
But there's a second point about the role of the United States. Here
let me shift gears a little bit. So far in my comments today, I've fo-
cused on dynamics within individual nations. In the final part of my
book, however, I suggest by analogy that at the world level, the
United States itself has come to be perceived as a kind of global
MDM, wielding wildly-disproportionate economic power relative to
our size and numbers.41 Just four percent of the world's population,
we are seen everywhere (not incorrectly) as the principal engine and
the principle beneficiary of global capitalism. 42 In part as a result, the
United States has become the object of mass popular, often dema-
gogue-fueled resentment and hatred of the same kind that is directed
at so many other MDMs around the world. Obviously, the analogy is
not perfect: Americans are not an ethnic minority, but instead a na-
tional origin minority, a close cousin. Moreover, there is no democ-
racy at the global level. And there are many other factors in play-
our cultural dominance, our foreign policy, etc. Nevertheless, I think
you'll see many of the same backlashes I've just described also oper-
ating today at the world level, only now directed against the United
States, whether in the form of resolutions passed in the United Na-
tions General Assembly or the September 11 terrorist attacks.
One of the reasons I like this analogy to the global level is that it
highlights a deep inconsistency in U.S. policy, an inconsistency that
the rest of the world is acutely aware of: when the United States calls
for world democratization, what we envision is a world filled with
democratic countries-with ourselves at the helm leading all those
countries! The last thing most Americans want is a true world de-
mocracy, in which our economic and political fate is determined by a
majority of the world's countries or citizens (the idea of the United
Nations General Assembly controlling U.S. foreign investments, for
example, would not be appealing to most Americans). Like other
41. See id. at 230 (comparing America's disproportionate economic wealth and
power to that of the Chinese in the Philippines or the Lebanese in West Africa).
42. See id. (remarking that although the United States constitutes only a small
percentage of the world's population, the United States "dominates every as-
pect ... of the global free markets").
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MDMs, we don't trust the relatively poor, frustrated, resentful ma-
jorities surrounding us necessarily to act in our best interests.
Let me say here, as an aside, that I've spoken on this topic to many
different groups, including internationally. What I've found is that
everyone seems to agree that the United States is the world's MDM.
But there is huge, bitter disagreement over why we are a MDM and
over what kind of MDM we are. According to many groups I've
spoken to in the United States, the United States is a market-
dominant country because Americans work really hard, because our
system offers the most opportunities, which attracts the best and the
brightest, because we have the best economic and political institu-
tions, and everyone is envious. By contrast, when I talk to people
from Europe or from developing countries, I find that they see the
United States as the world's ultimate crony capitalist: a tiny, greedy,
hypocritical minority using its tremendous economic power to con-
trol the politics, economies, resources, and destinies of other nations.
I actually think that both extreme accounts contain more than a grain
of truth.
What should we do about all of this? Should the United States stop
trying to promote markets and democracy in the non-Western world?
And perhaps surprisingly, my answer is that I don't think we should
stop trying. I think it's clear that some form of market-generated
growth offers the best hope for developing countries. And I'm also
not in the "markets first, democracy later, or maybe never" camp. In
other words, despite the subtitle of my book (which wasn't my
idea!), I'm very much in favor of promoting both markets and de-
mocracy globally, as a long-term ideal.
But there are many different versions of free market democracy,
and I do think we've been exporting the wrong version-a carica-
ture. There is no Western nation today with anything close to a lais-
sez-faire system. We have progressive taxation, social security, anti-
trust laws, securities laws, anti-fraud laws, etc. Yet for the last
twenty years, we've been urging poor countries around the world to
adopt a bare-knuckled brand of capitalism that the United States and
Europe abandoned long ago,43 basically raw capitalism with no
43. See id. at 194-95 (explaining how Western democracies offer relief for the




safety nets or mechanisms for redistribution. It's the same with de-
mocracy. Since 1989, the U.S. government has been pressing devel-
oping countries around the world (with the glaring exception of the
Middle East) to implement immediate elections with universal suf-
frage.' Now, to be honest, this is not the path to democratization that
any of the Western nations pursued: we disenfranchised our poor for
generations, including through explicit property qualifications. 45 But
it's crucial to remember that democracy in the West today consists of
much more than just unrestrained majority rule-it's also about mi-
nority protections, property protections, constitutionalism, and hu-
man rights. A lot more is needed than just shipping out ballot boxes
for elections, which of course brought people like Slobodan Mil-
osevic to power.
So that's one of the main policy thrusts of my book. I think the in-
ternational law community needs to rethink the kinds of market and
democratic processes that we should be promoting. We need to find
ways to give the poor majorities of the world a stake-psychological
and actual-in a market economy, particularly in the corporate sec-
tor. Otherwise, it is perfectly rational for them to vote for anti-market
leaders. More generally, we need to acknowledge when there are ten-
sions in our policy proposals; sadly, not all good things go together
in a simplistic way. I often hear lawyers with the best of intentions
calling for "free markets, free and fair elections, civil society, rule of
law, and human rights," as if these things always work in the same
direction.46 But that's just not the case, at least not in the short run.
Sometimes there are difficult choices that have to be made; what if
free and fair elections produce a regime that opposes women's
rights? What if free markets don't engender democracy, but rather,
crony capitalism? Is the "rule of law" always liberal? International
44. See id. at 275 (contrasting the United States and Europe's gradual extension
of suffrage with newly-democratic non-Western countries, many of which have
extended suffrage on a large scale in a relatively short period of time).
45. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 1, at 199-200 (drawing attention to the Jim
Crow laws instituted in the American South in order to prevent blacks from voting,
and noting that such laws were often enforced with violence).
46. See id. at 274 (arguing that although constitutional safeguards and human
rights are necessary in developing countries, they are not the answer to the MDM
problem, and are often discredited by the ethnonationalist risings that they were
intended to forestall).
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lawyers need to lead the way in being frank about possible tensions
across values and norms; they need to be able to articulate the
grounds for their choices.
I also make a very different policy suggestion in the book. I call on
MDMs themselves to step up and take a role. Without necessarily
blaming MDMs, I try to make the case that it may be in the MDMs'
best interests to avoid objectionable practices and to make voluntary
and visible contributions to the economies in which they are so visi-
bly thriving and dominating. It's not so much for the redistributive
potential-we should not trivialize the depth and pervasiveness of
poverty in the developing world. But in my view, the symbolic im-
portance of such gestures of generosity, humility, and cooperation
should not be underestimated.
I would like to make three caveats or clarifications before I stop.
My thesis is frequently misunderstood, so I thought I'd try to dispel
some of those misunderstandings before I take questions. First, I am
not proposing a universal theory. There are certainly developing
countries without MDMs, in which none of the dynamics I describe
occur-China and Argentina are two major examples.47 Also it's
striking to note that none of the "East Asian Tigers" had a MDM. For
me, these countries-Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong,
Taiwan-are the exceptions that prove the rule. Second, I am not of-
fering a theory of why ethnic conflict occurs; I'm not arguing, for ex-
ample, that ethnic violence arises only when there's a MDM, or
when countries democratize. That would be ridiculous; there are
countless examples of violence against economically-oppressed mi-
norities and ethnic violence perpetrated by vicious dictators. Thirdly,
and finally, I am emphatically not trying to blame ethnic conflict on
globalization, on markets, or on democracy; I am certainly not sug-
gesting, for example, that democracy is more likely to produce ethnic
conflict than authoritarianism! My thesis is not about blame, but
rather about unintended consequences. Thus, my own view is that the
results of democratization in Indonesia have been disastrous. But if
forced to place blame somewhere, I would point the finger at thirty
years of plundering autocracy and crony capitalism by Suharto,
which sowed the seeds.
47. See id. at 178 (noting that in all of the "Asian Tigers," the ethnic majority is
both economically and politically dominant).
1252 [19:1239
GROTIUS LECTURE
Similarly, in Iraq, overnight national elections might well bring re-
sults that many of us would find undesirable. Like the former Yugo-
slavia, Iraq's ethnic dynamics are extremely complicated-including
cross-cutting conflicts among Kurds, Shi'ites, and Sunnis, many hor-
rendous massacres, and deep feelings of hatred and a need for re-
venge.48 In particular, Shi'ites represent a roughly sixty percent,
long-oppressed majority in Iraq.49 It is impossible to predict, but
there are many indications that free and fair national elections and
majority rule in the near future could well bring to power an Islami-
cist, anti-secular, anti-women's rights, and possibly even anti-market
regime.50 But again, that wouldn't be democracy's fault. On the con-
trary, if anything, the blame rests in large part with colonial divide-
and-conquer policies and the cruelly repressive regime of Saddam
Hussein. Unfortunately, this fact takes nothing away from the reality
that, given the conditions that actually exist now in many post-
colonial countries--conditions created by history, colonialism, cor-
ruption, cronyism, and autocracy-the combination of laissez-faire
capitalism and unrestrained majority rule may well have catastrophic
consequences.
48. See generally Brian Bennett et. al., Will Iraq Start To Unravel?; Kurdish
Calls for Autonomy are Generating Fears of Ethnic Conflict that Could Compli-
cate U.S. Exit Plans, TIME, Feb. 16, 2004 (stating that "[e]thnic grudges die hard in
Iraq," and that long-standing tensions between Kurds, Shi'ites, and Sunnis might
complicate U.S. plans for Iraq, perhaps resulting in civil war).
49. See Press Release, Voice of America, Iraqi Shi'ite Clerics Wield Growing
Political Clout (Dec. 8, 2003) (labeling Saddam Hussein "the last in a long line of
Sunni Muslim leaders" that repressed the Sunni majority, which makes up sixty
percent of Iraq's twenty-four million people).
50. But see David L. Phillips, Elections in Iraq: A New Hope for Democracy,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at A21 (commenting that U.S. fears of a fundamen-
talist government emerging in Iraq are "over blown" because, in a national survey,
only twelve percent of the population of Iraq supports a government of predomi-
nantly religious leaders, and only one percent support an Islamic government).
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